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Airline Codeshare Alliances
Marketing Boon and Revenue Management Information
Systems Challenge
Codeshare alliances are a popular instrument for airlines to grow proﬁtably. This paper
juxtaposes the challenges that they create for analytical information systems on the one
hand and their motivation from a marketing perspective on the other. In this regard,
revenue management systems as a central tool of the ticketing process are of particular
interest. Complementary codesharing reduces alliance-wide revenues by up to 1 %. Losses
disseminate over the whole network and increase with total demand and the degree of
codeshare demand. Virtual codesharing causes losses of up to 1.5 % depending on the
discount level offered by the marketing carrier and on the demand structure. Based on the
ﬁndings, recommendations for airline management and future research are derived.
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As competitive pressure increases, mergers and alliances are gaining popularity
across all industries. A large and growing
body of management research considers
the topic; compare for example Ireland et
al. (2002, pp. 413–446) for a discussion
of the role of management in corporate
alliances. At the same time, mergers and
alliances provide new opportunities for
information systems (IS) research: They
pose challenges to communication and
information consistency, and increase the
size and complexity of decision support
tasks, as discussed for example in Killing
(1988, pp. 55–67).
Many industries regard alliances as the
appropriate framework to build more efficient and profitable business networks.
Airline codeshare alliances are a typical
example. They enable carriers to cooperate when trade and ownership regulations make other forms of cooperation
impossible (Park 1997, pp. 181–195). According to de la Torre (1999, pp. 60–
75), the five main benefits of airline alliances are greater network reach, access to foreign markets, increased market penetration, higher traffic volumes
and cost benefits due to synergy. From a
marketing perspective, these benefits lead
to potential gains through the extension
of the product portfolio, improved customer relationship management, and the
establishment of common sales policies
across markets.
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In 2010, the three large airline alliances – Star Alliance, One World and
Sky Team – accounted for 54 members
and a market share of almost 60 % of
revenue passenger kilometers (Jain 2011,
p. 24). Their popularity stems from the
low margins prevalent in the industry:
High competition and increasing costs
combined with price-sensitive customers
force airlines to collaborate with strategic
partners.
Codesharing enables airlines to jointly
market their capacity by assigning their
designators to a common flight. For example, the Lufthansa flight LH430 from
Frankfurt to Chicago is also marketed by
United Airlines as flight UA8836, by Thai
Airways as flight TG7708, by Air Canada
(AC9457) and Air India (AI8637). While
Lufthansa operates the flight (operating
carrier), each codeshare partner may sell
seats on it (marketing carrier). By means
of this concept, the marketing carriers extend their product portfolio without requiring extra resources; they feed additional passengers into their own network
and augment demand on major routes
(Vinod 2005, pp. 66–82). Moreover, they
can access new markets: In the example,
Thai offers a flight that neither departs
from nor arrives in its home market.
We collected data at Lufthansa German Airlines indicating an increase in alliance capacity of about 42 % from 2001
to 2011. The data also reveal that more
than half of Lufthansa marketed flights
are operated by allied carriers. Similarly,
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the majority of Lufthansa operated flights
is marketed through at least one other
airline. Overall, codesharing accounts for
6–8 % of Lufthansa bookings and has
become a crucial factor in the airline’s
business strategy.
Alliances generate new challenges for
the airline planning process and the analytical information systems supporting
it. These include the increased complexity of the underlying decision support
problems as well as the exchange of information and the coordination of joint
decisions.
This paper contributes to information
systems and airline alliance research in
two ways: On the one hand, it provides a
structured description of marketing benefits and information systems’ challenges.
On the other hand, the simulation results quantify the impact of decentralized
codeshare control, thereby prompting to
close the gap between theoretical research
and the current practical implementation
of alliance revenue management.
The rest of this article is organized as
follows. We begin with an extensive literature review in Sects. 2 and 3. We consider the benefits of airline codeshare alliances as a marketing tool and cluster
relevant literature accordingly. Following
this overview, we outline the airline planning process under the aspect of implementing codeshare alliances. Subsequently, we critically consider the resulting challenges for analytical information
systems. After introducing the simulation
approach in Sect. 4, we use it to estimate
the cost of codesharing on revenue management and to derive benchmarks for
the performance of codeshare alliances
in Sect. 5. The paper closes with a summary of the findings and recommendations toward further application oriented
research.

2 Marketing Promises of Airline
Codeshare Alliances
From a marketing perspective, three major promises render airline codeshare alliances attractive: synergy in customer relationship management, the extension of
the product portfolio, and the establishment of common sales policies.
2.1 Customer Relationship Management
In airline alliances, cost efficient customer relationship management can be
realized through infrastructure synergy
154

and improved resource utilization. Examples for potentially shared resources
are gates, lounges, and check-in facilities.
Synergy arises by pooling ground and
maintenance operations as well as purchasing and marketing activities (Morrish and Hamilton 2002, pp. 401–407).
Sharing each other’s infrastructure also
improves the service quality: For example, passengers obtain access to more
lounges than could be efficiently maintained by a single carrier, and shared
terminals reduce transfer times and distances between gates. Further quality aspects associated with alliances include
safety, reliability, professionalism, and on
board service. Along with a common logo
and slogan, these factors establish the alliance as a brand, foster its recognition,
and distinguish it from other airlines and
alliances.
Alliance members often merge
their frequent flyer programs, thereby
strengthening the ties between the alliance and its customers (de la Torre
1999, p. 79). Passengers can earn and redeem miles within the entire alliance network; privileges of status customers, such
as lounge access, priority boarding and
late check-in, are globally recognized.
In addition to increased flight frequencies and a wider variety of connections,
codesharing allows airlines to create
seamless travel opportunities (Brueckner
2001, pp. 1475–1498). Seamless travel
provides the impression of travelling on
a single airline and is supported by common market interfaces and joint scheduling. The advantages of seamless travel
include single ticketing, check-in and
baggage drop-off.
2.2 Product Portfolio
Codeshare partners enrich their product portfolio by selling tickets for each
other’s flights. Oum et al. (1996, pp. 187–
202) differentiate three types of codesharing: complementary, parallel, and virtual
codesharing. For a complementary codeshare, flights operated by two or more airlines are combined to form a new route
(Oum et al. 1996, pp. 187–202). In contrast, in a parallel codeshare each carrier
also operates the route individually. Virtual codeshares refer to an airline offering a route while not operating any of the
flights involved.
Complementary codesharing is prevalent in international alliances where individual networks rarely overlap: The main
objective is to extend network reach and

to access foreign markets. The airlines in
the example above are suited for complementary codesharing as they have distinct home markets and only few shared
routes.
Parallel codeshares can mostly be
found in domestic markets. On the domestic level, airline networks tend to
have more overlap: Partners focus on
increasing market penetration and aim
to reduce competition on jointly served
routes. In international alliances, parallel codeshares typically occur on hubto-hub routes, i.e., Chicago–Frankfurt as
offered by United and Lufthansa.
Several authors use an economic perspective to demonstrate the effect of
complementary and parallel codesharing on prices, traffic volumes, and social welfare. Adler and Smilowitz (2007,
pp. 394–409), Brueckner and Whalen
(2000, pp. 503–545) and others find
that complementary codeshares positively affect prices, output and welfare.
For parallel codesharing, the same contributions point out the prevalence of
anti-competitive effects as prices increase while traffic volumes and welfare
decrease.
Last but not least, virtual codesharing
is predominantly a strategic marketing
tool, as the marketing carrier does not
supply capacity. Virtual codeshares occur
in domestic as well as international markets and are described in further detail
in Ito and Lee (2007, pp. 355–380) and
Gayle (2007, pp. 17–18).
2.3 Sales Policies
Possibly the most ambivalent benefit of
airline alliances is the potential to establish common sales policies. On the one
hand, alignments can provide dependable standards for customers, increasing
the perceived fairness of pricing and simplifying the purchasing process. On the
other hand, they can easily catch the whiff
of price fixing and cartel building.
The feasible extent of sales policy coordination depends on the alliance’s legal situation. This may vary depending
on the formal background – if the cooperation legally is a merger but the partners remain independent for organizational reasons, sales policy coordination
can reach as far as desired. If the cooperation consists of agreements between
economically separate and possibly competing airlines, it is strictly regulated by
competition laws.
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Using their partners’ sales channels,
airlines can increase their visibility in
the global distribution systems (GDS).
GDS form the largest distribution channel (followed by carriers’ websites and
third party providers) and are accessed
by travel agencies (Boyd and Bilegan
2003, p. 1365). Higher visibility, for example through preference display, increases market penetration and purchase
probability (Boyd and Bilegan 2003,
pp. 1363–1386). Continuing the example, Lufthansa flight LH430 also appears
as UA8836, TG7708, AC9457 and AI8637
in the GDS or on Internet travel sites,
turning a single service into five different
offers.
As another benefit, codeshare connections appear as online connections in the
GDS and therefore take a more prominent position than genuine interline connections (Bamberger et al. 2004, p. 198).
Similar to the display of search results on
the Internet, the higher an offer is ranked,
the more likely customers will choose it.
Furthermore, empirical research by Bamberger et al. (2004, pp. 195–222) has
shown that customers prefer online to interline connections: One reason is comparatively lower prices, but brand loyalty
and perception of the marketing carrier
also play a role.
Finally, online connections are easier
to advertise: A carrier can independently
tailor and communicate the offer. It can
customize the tariffs as well as the marketing process to fit its brand perception and home market. As a result, airlines share marketing costs while benefitting from each other’s regional competence and local market knowledge. Using their partners’ existing sales channels, they can construct more effective
and more efficient campaigns.

3 Airline Planning and Operations
Systems in Codeshare Alliances
For more than forty years, airline planning and operations have been supported
by analytical information systems. As described in Smith et al. (2001, pp. 37–
55), this has allowed airlines to systematically include operations research principles and to adopt electronic business
concepts early on. Alliance membership
introduces additional complications to
most information systems, and these are
in the focus of the second part of the
literature review presented in this section.
Business & Information Systems Engineering

3.1 Alliance Impacts on Airline Planning
Systems
As described by Belobaba (2009, pp. 153–
181), the first part of the airline planning process includes fleet planning,
route planning, and schedule development. The author refers to this as strategic planning. The task of assigning prices
and allocating availabilities may be regarded as the second part and considered
to be of tactical nature.
The first step of strategic planning, fleet
planning, is generally not affected by alliances: While a homogeneous fleet might
be more cost efficient, individual strategic factors take precedence. Alliance considerations first arise during route planning and flight scheduling. Both are often based on economic and revenue forecasts. The existence of complementing or
parallel offers by alliance partners can
influence these, affecting the expected
performance on certain routes.
The development of flight schedules
is also supported by operations research
systems: Fleet assignment and aircraft rotations are optimized according to given
conditions such as departure and arrival slots, available aircrafts, technical
constraints and demand forecasts. Efficient schedules with regard to connection times and fleet utilization are hampered by codesharing complications. For
example, not just connections to flights
operated by the own airline, but also to
those constituting complementary codeshares should be considered. On parallel
routes, partners could avoid direct competition caused by wing-to-wing flights.
Demand forecasts that form the basis of
planning can be improved by including
codeshare demand.
The tactical steps of crew scheduling,
airport resource management and operations control are based on the results
of flight scheduling. Here, only minimal
considerations with regard to alliance
partners are required: At most, the access
to commonly used airport infrastructure such as lounges, gates or check-in
facilities needs to be coordinated.
Information exchange plays a crucial
role for the integration of codeshare alliances in the planning process. At least,
the partners’ plans with regard to routes
and schedules should be exchanged;
merged demand forecasts, however, will
provide the best possible coordination.
In the tactical stage of airline planning concerned with price and inventory
optimization, the role of information
3|2013

exchange becomes increasingly important. Whereas infrequent exchanges can
support strategic planning, information
about pricing and revenue management
should be as current as possible. As will
be shown in Sect. 3.2, alliance revenue
management (RM) ideally asks for common demand forecasts, common pricing
and consistent availability controls. As
such a close cooperation may not be desired or admissible, the gap between the
theoretical alliance-wide optimum and
most practical implementations widens.
Finally, also the impact of alliances
on sales and distribution is considerable.
While GDS already enable codeshare offers, the airlines must adapt their internal ticketing processes and possibly other
sales channels.
As shown in Fig. 1, pricing and RM are
among those steps of the planning process where the impact of codeshare alliances is strongest: Either the partners
jointly exploit customers’ willingness-topay or they underbid each other, accepting profit setbacks through cannibalization. In this area, the trade-off between
potential marketing benefits and challenges to IS design is especially prominent. For this reason, our subsequent
analysis focuses on the challenges for
alliance revenue management systems.
3.2 Challenges for Alliance Revenue
Management Systems
From an information systems perspective, alliances create two main challenges
for airline planning. Both are most apparent in revenue management, but also
apply to systems supporting the other
steps of the planning process.
Separate and Heterogeneous Systems
Most airlines operate complex and highly
customized RM systems to optimize their
individual performance. The market interface for codeshare itineraries needs to
be managed across these separate systems. To exploit the full codesharing
potential, it is essential to include information on such itineraries in each
airline’s calculations and to implement
common control capabilities.
Incomplete Information As carriers
in international alliances typically remain independent entities, antitrust laws
restrict the exchange of information.
Therefore, not all information necessary to optimally manage codeshare
itineraries is available to all partners. This
155
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Fig. 1 The airline planning
process and alliance
considerations

includes prices, demand forecasts and
product structures, and as far as possible
booking data. Due to the restrictions on
information exchange, potential benefits
from joint planning become difficult to
realize.
For the success and stability of an alliance it is crucial to overcome these challenges. With regard to RM, two central questions emerge: First, what is the
most feasible way for alliance carriers to
exchange availability information across
their separate systems? And second, how
should airlines forecast demand and optimize codeshare itineraries with only
incomplete information?
Interviews with industry experts of
Lufthansa have revealed that availability exchange is in practice mostly restricted to availability status messages
(AVS). The operating carrier communicates local booking class availabilities
to the marketing carrier (Vinod 2005,
p. 69). The marketing carrier calculates
the minimum availabilities across all operating carriers. A booking class becomes
available if and only if all operating
carriers offer it locally.
As flight level availabilities distort network controls and tend to be more
restrictive (see Talluri and van Ryzin
2004, pp. 81–122), bid price sharing provides a network-based extension: Instead
of exchanging booking class availabilities, the carriers exchange current bid
prices – the marginal value of the next
seat. Many carriers implementing network revenue management already use
bid price controls and bid price sharing has been shown to increase revenue
(Jain 2011, pp. 92–101). However, the
exchange of bid prices requires partial
antitrust immunity. Additionally, practitioners report that nowadays bid price
156

sharing is rarely used in practice. Therefore, the computational study presented
in this text implements AVS availability exchange. For discussions of the two
methods refer to the contributions by
Boyd (1998, pp. 1–7) and Vinod (2005,
pp. 66–82).
Although some alliances have been
granted partial immunity, practitioners
further report no or little information exchange with regard to bookings and expected demand. While the marketing carrier knows the exact bookings and availabilities, the operating carriers may not
be able to distinguish codeshare bookings from local bookings. This lack of
information prevents airlines from explicitly forecasting and optimizing codeshare itineraries. Instead, they are forecasted and optimized together with local
bookings.
Finally, the information asymmetry between operating and marketing carrier
creates a moral hazard: The marketing
carrier may use the additional information to independently maximize its revenue at the cost of its partners. However,
this inequality balances out as all operating carriers usually offer a codeshare
route.
3.3 Related Research on Airline Alliances
Having discussed the marketing benefits
of codeshare alliances as well as their impact on information systems, let us also
mention that there is a growing body of
related research devoted to other aspects
of airline alliances. As this paper focuses
on the implications of current codeshare
techniques applied in practice, this section provides only a brief overview of this
literature.
Abdelghany et al. (2009, pp. 307–330)
discuss the selection of codeshare flights

in a hypothetical alliance network as
one aspect of alliance formation. Their
model explicitly considers the tradeoff
between additional codeshare passengers
and displaced local demand, but does not
incorporate seat allocation decisions.
De la Torre (1999, pp. 1–215) provides
a general introduction to codesharing
and also highlights its impact on the revenue management process. Darot (2001,
pp. 1–168), and more recently Jain (2011,
pp. 1–142), present two large-scale simulation studies that evaluate the effect of
various codeshare control approaches on
alliance performance and traffic mix.
Wright et al. (2010, pp. 15–37), Topaloglu (2012, pp. 500–517) and Hu et
al. (2013, pp. 1–38) provide a more theoretical perspective on alliance revenue
management. Topaloglu proposes an improvement to decentralized codeshare
availability control. The other papers focus on revenue sharing – the process of
distributing codeshare revenues among
the participating carriers – and demonstrate its impact on availability decisions.
Wright et al. compare several static and
dynamic schemes in terms of alliance revenues; Hu et al. develop a static scheme
that implements the central solution in
the local systems of the alliance partners.
Although this research proposes interesting enhancements to the codeshare
process, most suggestions are not directly
applicable to practice. This is due to practical limitations imposed by decentralization and incomplete information – the
two aspects discussed in Sect. 3.2. Some
authors acknowledge this and suggest
heuristic approaches that satisfy more
realistic but still not generally feasible
conditions. The simulation results documented in Sect. 5 emphasize the need to
fill this research gap.
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4 The Simulation Approach
As the success of revenue management is
difficult to measure due to such factors
as changes in demand, competition, marketing campaigns and special offers, the
computational study presented here relies on a simulation approach. By analyzing multiple simulation scenarios, we
establish benchmarks for the cost of decentralized codeshare revenue management under conditions of incomplete
information.
4.1 The REMATE Simulation
Environment
As described in Frank et al. (2008,
pp. 7–16), simulation experiments are
frequently used to evaluate the success of
revenue management approaches. Simulations allow for ceteris paribus market conditions when comparing various
strategies. Such an evaluation is not feasible in the real world, where changes in
economic factors and competitor strategy
may lead to diverging outcomes.
We use a web-based simulation system called REMATE which was developed by Lufthansa and several cooperating universities in 2009 (Cleophas 2012,
pp. 163–170). REMATE is based on the
recommendations for revenue management simulations listed in Frank et al.
(2008, pp. 7–16) and implemented using Java. The affiliated universities use
REMATE for application-driven theoretical research; at Lufthansa, the system
supports strategic decisions and training.
4.2 Modeling Customers, Airlines and
Revenue Management
The simulation model implemented in
REMATE combines discrete-event-based
and agent-based modeling: Airlines and
customers are represented by agents, acquiring information from their environment and manipulating it through their
decisions. Each action is scheduled as an
event and realized sequentially. Stochastic elements include the variation of demand volume and customer characteristics.
Our customer model contains six customer types with varying sensitivity to
prices and products. For the sake of
simplicity, there are no cancellations,
re-bookings nor repeated requests. The
demand volume is given by a demand-tocapacity ratio. The local or intraline demand of a carrier includes all requests
Business & Information Systems Engineering

Fig. 2 Network with one hub and 12 spokes served by two airlines
for routes exclusively served by that carrier. Requests for routes served jointly by
both carriers are referred to as codeshare
demand.
The airlines in this study operate distinct network revenue management systems, assume independent demand (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004, pp. 301–303)
and use perfect forecasts as basis for revenue maximization. Optimization is realized through the Dynamic Programming Decomposition described in Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004, p. 107), resulting
in bid price controls. The available offers are displayed in a GDS, where customers book tickets. Based on the observed bookings, the airlines update their
control decisions repeatedly during the
booking period.
In the case of alliances, the airlines follow the setup described in Sect. 3.2: They
operate distinct RM systems, do not explicitly forecast and optimize the codeshare itineraries, and use AVS to control the codeshare booking process. AVS
information is exchanged each time a
booking request arrives. The revenue of
codeshare itineraries is shared based on
the relative length of the individual flights
(mileage proration).
4.3 Simulation Scenarios Implemented
The scenarios implemented for the computational study aim to be sufficiently
small to provide traceable effects but realistic enough to generate meaningful findings. To this end, they model actual network constellations and were calibrated
by means of Lufthansa booking data.
All scenarios contain 12 flights – four
long-haul and eight short-haul flights. In
the monopoly scenario, all flights are operated by a single airline; in the codeshare scenarios, two airlines operate half
the flights each, as depicted in Fig. 2. The
two sub-networks are symmetric and do
not overlap, i.e., the distances between
3|2013

the hub and the spokes are the same, and
spoke airports are served by exactly one
airline. In its local network, each airline
sells 15 intraline itineraries; 18 additional
codeshare itineraries are created when
the two networks are connected. Both
carriers market all codeshare itineraries.
A capacity of 400 and 200 seats respectively per long-haul and short-haul flight
is divided into two compartments (80 %
Economy, 20 % Business). The business compartment includes three booking classes; the economy compartment
includes eight booking classes. Each class
has unique product restrictions. Prices
are based on the distance flown and a
class specific multiplier derived through
regression over Lufthansa fare structures.
The prices on complementary codeshare
routes are the same for each airline.
For this study, five different supply scenarios are combined with seven demand
clusters. Each scenario includes two airlines in different codeshare situations: In
three scenarios, the carriers offer complementary codeshares created by connecting the two sub-networks in Fig. 2. Each
incoming flight of one airline connects to
every outgoing flight of the other airline.
The results are compared to the optimal
solution determined by monopolistically
optimizing all flights and itineraries.
The first three scenarios differ by the
distribution of demand between airlines.
In scenario S demand is symmetric: The
demand-to-capacity ratio as well as the
traffic mix – the proportion of codeshare
to local demand – is the same for every
airline. In the other two scenarios, AS1
and AS2, the demand is asymmetric: In
AS1, one carrier offers 25 % less capacity, but the demand remains unchanged.
Hence, the share of codeshare demand
is equal, but the demand-to-capacity ratio for this carrier is one third higher
than that observed by the other carrier.
In AS2, one carrier’s capacity and local demand (but not the codeshare demand) are reduced by 25 %. As a result,
157

BISE – RESEARCH PAPER

Table 1 Overview of scenarios
Scenario

Type of codeshare

Demand-to-capacity ratio

Traffic mix

S

Complementary

Symmetric

Symmetric

AS1

Complementary

Asymmetric

Symmetric

Table 3 Bookings and revenue without codesharing in scenario S
Bookings

Revenue

Cluster 1

76.83 %

66.82 %

AS2

Complementary

Symmetric

Asymmetric

Cluster 2

80.49 %

66.32 %

V25

Virtual

Symmetric

Symmetric

Cluster 3

81.52 %

66.21 %

V50

Virtual

Symmetric

Symmetric

Cluster 4

90.34 %

68.24 %

Cluster 5

92.55 %

68.70 %

Cluster 6

92.18 %

69.06 %

Cluster 7

68.66 %

66.82 %

Table 2 Overview of demand clusters
Demand cluster

Demand-to-capacity ratio

Share of business demand

Willingness-to-pay

1

Low (1.22)

Very high (25 %)

High (9.64)

2

Medium (1.31)

High (22 %)

High (9.17)

3

Medium (1.35)

Medium (20 %)

Medium (8.38)

4

High (1.46)

Medium (19 %)

Medium (7.75)

5

Very high (1.58)

Very low (14 %)

Low (7.24)

6

Very high (1.62)

Medium (20 %)

Medium (8.38)

7

Very low (1.13)

Medium (20 %)

Medium (8.38)

the demand-to-capacity ratio for the local demand is the same, but the smaller
carrier’s share of codeshare passengers is
higher.
Two further scenarios (V25 and V50)
simulate virtual codesharing. We introduce a second, virtual airline to
the monopoly scenario, which sells all
itineraries without operating any flights.
Note that in case of proper availability
exchange and common product restrictions and prices, the marketing airline’s
offers would not deviate from the operating carrier’s offers. However, in practice, this is usually not the case: First,
the availability exchange method may not
be consistent with the local availability
control method of the respective carrier.
Second, the marketing airline frequently
offers different product restrictions or
lower fares.
To simulate the cost of virtual codesharing, we use AVS for codeshare control, while implementing bid price controls in the carriers’ local networks.
Therefore the availabilities determined by
the operating and the marketing carrier
are likely to deviate. Furthermore, we reduce the fares of the virtual airline by
two discount levels calculated in percent
of the difference between two subsequent
fares of the operating carrier. We copy every booking class of the operating carrier and subtract the discount between
the price of this class and the next cheaper
class. In V25, the discount percentage is
158

25 %; in V50 it is 50 %. The scenarios are
summarized in Table 1.
The seven demand clusters differ in the
demand-to-capacity ratio and in the distribution of demand across the customer
types, inducing differences in the overall
willingness-to-pay. Clusters 1 to 5 correspond to five typical demand situations
on intercontinental routes as observed in
the Lufthansa network. In all five clusters, demand exceeds capacity (ratios between 1.2 and 1.6), but the customer mix
varies from high value business to high
volume leisure. Clusters 6 and 7 present
the same customer mix as Cluster 3 with
an alteration of +/−20 % total demand,
resulting in relatively high (Cluster 6) and
low (Cluster 7) demand-to-capacity ratios. The share of codeshare demand is
30 % across all scenarios and clusters
except for the small carrier in AS2, for
which the share increases to 40 %. An
overview of the seven clusters is provided
in Table 2. Note that the willingness-topay factor needs to be multiplied with the
square root of the distance of a specific
itinerary in order to obtain the average
willingness-to-pay on that itinerary.

5 Computational Study:
Quantifying the Alliance Eﬀect
This section presents the results of the
simulation study outlined in the previous
section. Each scenario is executed over

100 runs; the final results are the average
over all runs with 95 % confidence.
5.1 Market Extension through
Complementing Codeshares
By means of codesharing complementary flights, carriers can access new markets and thus cater for 30 % of networkwide demand. Table 3 depicts the aggregate revenue and bookings in Scenario S without the codeshare routes to
show the market extension benefit. The
results are stated as percentages of the
monopoly outcome that a single airline is
able to achieve across the entire network
including codeshare demand.
Revenue in all clusters is about one
third lower than the potential maximum, indicating that the carriers cannot compensate for revenue losses by local demand. In fact, they are losing even
more revenue than demand, suggesting
that codeshare demand is more valuable. In terms of bookings, we find that
in Clusters 1 and 7 with low and very
low demand-to-capacity ratios, the lost
bookings correspond to the reduction in
demand. In clusters with relatively high
demand-to-capacity ratios, the majority
of bookings can be compensated by local
demand.
Symmetric Demand The impact of decentralized codeshare control with AVS
under symmetric demand is shown in
Fig. 3. As in the subsequent analyses,
bookings and revenue are presented as
bars illustrating the percentage change
compared to monopolistic controls.
Bookings decrease slightly in four of
seven clusters and significantly decrease
by up to 0.7 % in the high demand
Clusters 5 and 6. Only in Cluster 7 we
see a small increase. Overall, codesharing has no strong impact on the resulting
bookings.
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Fig. 3 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario S

Fig. 4 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario AS1

With regard to revenue, we observe
a drop across all clusters compared to
the monopoly situation. The effect varies
from −0.23 to −0.98 %, with the greatest losses occurring in clusters 5 and 6
(high demand-to-capacity ratios). This
result can be attributed to the inefficiencies of AVS described in Sect. 3.2
as well as to effects of separate forecasting and optimization. Both aspects cause
the availabilities to differ from the monopolistic optimum and thereby lead to
sub-optimal control decisions.
As argued in Chap. 2, codesharing
enables airlines to exploit new passenger streams. However, as capacity is restricted, displacement costs arise and new
codeshare routes can harm the passenger flow on intraline itineraries. To analyze this, Fig. 3 displays two lines presenting the revenue gap on codeshare and
intraline itineraries respectively. We find
that, except for Cluster 7, the impact on
intraline itineraries is distinctly stronger.
While the effect is ambiguous on codeshare itineraries – on average the performance is about the same as in the
Business & Information Systems Engineering

monopoly case – it is always negative
on intraline itineraries. This can be explained by each airline forecasting and
optimizing codeshare bookings on the local intraline itineraries. As a result, the
intraline forecasts increase and revenue
management controls become overly restrictive, leading to fewer bookings and
less revenue.
Asymmetric Demand Since, so far, demand for both airlines was symmetric,
both carriers had 50 % market share
and the losses were distributed equally.
In contrast, this section considers two
scenarios with deviating demand situations. In AS1, the capacity of one carrier is reduced by 25 %, reducing overall capacity by 12.5 %, while demand remains constant. Thus, the carrier with
the smaller capacity faces excess demand and its demand-to-capacity ratio
increases to up to 2.4. The results compared to the monopoly situation with the
same demand and capacity pattern are
depicted in Fig. 4.
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In AS2, we also reduce the local demand for the smaller carrier, leaving
the codeshare demand unchanged. Consequently, the share of codeshare demand increases. The results are depicted
in Fig. 5. Note that for both scenarios,
we also display the change in individual carriers’ revenue. To this end, results
are compared to the monopoly results
achieved exclusively from the flights assigned to this carrier. The revenue from
multi-leg itineraries is prorated based on
the relatively flown mileage.
First of all, we can note that in AS1
and AS2 the change in bookings is again
rather small. Across both scenarios as
well as all clusters, we find a consistent
decrease of around −0.5 % in the total
bookings (varying between −0.02 % to
−0.88 %).
In terms of revenue, the effect is strictly
negative, and with the exception of Cluster 7, the resulting losses are generally
higher than in the symmetric case. This
can be explained by the higher demandto-capacity ratios: In line with our observation in S, the higher the demand159
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Fig. 5 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario AS2

Fig. 6 Cost of virtual
codesharing – scenario V25

to-capacity ratio, the higher the losses
caused by inefficient codeshare revenue
management. In AS1, the revenue gap
amounts to −0.5 % to −3.34 %. In AS2,
the revenue gap is smaller than in AS1, as
the demand is lower. Yet it is still larger
than in S, due to the incremental codeshare demand. It varies between −0.17 %
and −2.13 %.
The performance of the individual carriers holds greater interest. As can be seen
from the two lines for the small and the
large carrier, the one with the reduced
capacity consistently suffers higher revenue losses. In AS1, these amount to up
to −6 %. In AS2, they approach −4.5 %.
The performance of the carrier with regular capacity in AS1 is only slightly worse
than in S, while in AS2, the losses are
about the same, and sometimes even
small gains occur.
In both cases, the highest losses occur in the clusters including many high
value passengers. First, in AS1, there is
generally more demand and therefore inefficient codeshare revenue management
incurs a higher risk: Suboptimal codeshare control is more likely to displace
high value passengers. Second, in AS2,
160

while the overall demand is not much
higher, the larger share of codeshare demand increases the impact of suboptimal acceptance decision taken by AVS.
As critical decisions are more likely when
codeshare demand is high, the probability to displace high value demand also
increases.
5.2 The Cost of Virtual Codeshares
This section analyzes how virtual codesharing affects the performance of the alliance. We introduce a virtual airline that
does not operate flights and solely markets the other carrier’s itineraries. The
fares of the virtual airline undercut those
offered by the operating carrier by 25 %
of the difference to the next cheaper
booking class in V25 and by 50 % in V50.
In the monopoly scenario, a single carrier
controls all classes, both the 11 original
ones and the 11 discounted classes. The
respective results are presented in Figs. 6
and 7.
We find that introducing an additional marketing carrier with lower fares
slightly increases the number of book-

ings in most clusters, particularly in
those with low and medium demand-tocapacity ratios. Once more, the change in
bookings is relatively small compared to
the effect on revenue: The latter is consistently negative across both scenarios
and all seven clusters. Given the moderate discount of 25 %, the effect varies
between −0.14 % and −0.68 %. With
the higher discount, the effect becomes
more pronounced and revenue declines
by between −0.51 % and −1.44 %.
The losses can be explained by the
monopoly airline jointly controlling the
regular and the discounted booking
classes. Thus it has full control over
all offers, while in the codeshare case
it cannot directly control the availability of the virtual codeshare classes. Instead, their availability is determined by
the sum of the AVS availabilities on the
respective flights. On the one hand, this
tends to be more restrictive. On the
other hand, virtual classes that become
available underbid the regular offers and
customers buy the lower fare, causing
revenue losses.
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Fig. 7 Cost of virtual
codesharing – scenario V50

6 Concluding Remarks

6.1 Managerial Implications

The contribution of this paper is twofold.
On the one hand, we cluster the benefits of airline alliances into three groups
of marketing promises and examine the
impact of codesharing on each step of
the airline planning process. The former
constitutes codeshare alliances as marketing tool. The latter serves as guideline to researchers as well as practitioners
on how to implement codeshare alliances
throughout the planning process.
On the other hand, we quantify the effect of decentralized booking control in
three typical codeshare situations. Our
model uses separate revenue management systems and assumes limited information exchange, as currently applied in
the industry. We find significant losses
due to suboptimal booking control. They
are the result of the information asymmetry (moral hazard) among the alliance
partners: Only the marketing carrier has
full information about the request and
makes the acceptance decision on behalf
of the operating carrier. In addition, neither carrier can verify whether the partners act in their mutual best interest. The
operating carrier cannot control the marketing carrier’s decision, while the marketing carrier cannot observe the correctness of the availabilities provided by
the operating carrier. In the economics
literature, this situation is described by
the principal-agent problem. As the revenue gap between the alliance and the
monopoly turns out to be significant in
our simulations, it is in the interest of all
members to implement mechanisms that
align the alliance decisions. In Sect. 6.1,
we continue this discussion and derive
four managerial implications from our
findings.

First, we found that in the symmetric scenario, revenue losses are not limited to
codeshare routes, but propagate through
the whole network, also affecting intraline itineraries. In fact, our results clearly
indicate that with the given revenue management setup, intraline itineraries bear
the most severe losses. This can be attributed to skewed local forecasts and to
suboptimal codeshare controls displacing more valuable local passengers. This
observation supports the need for separate codeshare forecasting and optimization. Also, management needs to consider these effects when evaluating the
performance of the alliance or that of
individual routes.
Second, our results show that airlines
with higher demand on intraline routes
or a higher share of codeshare demand
face an increased risk from suboptimal
codeshare management. Given an increase of about one third, the respective
carrier loses an additional 2 % to 3.5 % of
its revenue. Hence, this carrier’s management needs to be more restrictive when
picking partners and routes for codesharing. Furthermore, as a carrier in this situation faces a higher risk, it may want
to negotiate an incentive scheme guaranteeing a larger share of the resulting
revenue.
Third, we observed that virtual codesharing with underbidding causes revenue losses of up to 1.5 % (depending
on the discount level) when compared to
the case of monopoly. This indicates that
it is better for an airline to control all
its offers singlehandedly. Consequently,
partners and routes for virtual codesharing should be chosen with care; a regular evaluation of the marketing benefits
from the additional sales channel in relation to the loss of control seems highly
recommendable. In this context, aspects
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of trust and financial dependency are particularly important: Close partners or financially dependent carriers may have
fewer incentives to underbid or harm
their allies.
Last, we observe that across all scenarios, the volume of bookings is little affected by codesharing. Changes in
revenue are explained by shifts in the
distribution of bookings across booking
classes. Furthermore, losses in revenue
usually exceed the change in bookings,
thereby reducing the yield and suggesting that primarily high value bookings
are affected.
6.2 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of
airline codeshare alliances under two aspects: We contrasted the promises from
a marketing perspective with the challenges arising for airline planning supported by information systems. Focusing on revenue management systems as
the area in which the contrast between
the two aspects is clearest, we quantified
the effect of decentralized codeshare control using stochastic simulations. Finally,
we highlighted four managerial recommendations for codeshare revenue management as taken from the simulation
results.
The findings established in Sect. 5 are
based on large-scale stochastic simulations and were validated across seven typical demand constellations. The scenarios
cover several connecting flights, different
traffic flows, and realistic price and product structures. Possible extensions could
include a closed-loop revenue management model with adaptive forecasts, the
integration of competition, and the comparison of alternative RM approaches.
The first two points were neglected as
we expected a distortion of the effects of
161
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Airline Codeshare Alliances
Marketing Boon and Revenue
Management Information Systems
Challenge
The paper juxtaposes the challenges
that airline codeshare alliances create for analytical information systems
on the one hand and their motivation
from a marketing perspective on the
other. The authors review the state-ofthe-art literature on potential marketing beneﬁts and analyze the impact on
airline planning systems. In this regard,
revenue management systems are of
particular interest. Based on a simulation study, the authors infer a severe
impact of decentralized codeshare controls as currently widely implemented
in the industry on revenue management performance. In the scenarios examined, complementary codesharing
reduces alliance-wide revenues by up
to 1 %. Losses increase when a carrier experiences high local demand or a
high degree of codeshare demand, and
disseminate over the whole network.
Virtual codeshares also cause losses
of 0.3 % to 1.5 % depending on the
discount level offered by the marketing carrier and on the demand structure. Finally, the authors formulate a set
of managerial implications based on
these ﬁndings.

Keywords: Revenue management, Information systems, Airline alliances,
Codesharing, Simulation, Marketing
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codesharing: The performance of the alliance might be influenced by the quality
of the forecast as well as by the decisions
of the competitor. Nevertheless, both aspects and in particular the comparison
of alternative RM systems provide opportunities for ongoing research. Possible variations may include protection levels for availability control as well as forecast and optimization algorithms assuming dependent demand or incorporating
customer choice behavior.
We also note that our model is motivated by current industry practice. As
mentioned in Sect. 3.3, recent research
has introduced a number of theoretical advances. Implementing these features would most likely reduce the observed effects. However, the intention of
this paper is to highlight the necessity to
close the gap between the new, theoretical
approaches and the application-driven
implementations observed in practice.
Further research may extend our work
in several ways. First of all, we have not
considered parallel codeshares as a marketing tool and therefore have not included them in our investigation. A similar study could be conducted to determine the cost of suboptimal parallel
codesharing.
The impact of codeshare alliances may
be further studied in context of innovative pricing and revenue management approaches. For example, Post and
Spann (2012, pp. 329–338) provide an
analysis of variable opaque products on
the airline market. Codesharing can be
seen as a variant of opaque products, as
the customer may not directly observe
which alliance carrier operates the flight,
and the service level may vary between
consecutive flights.
In view of our results, alternative approaches to codeshare revenue management may attempt to minimize the effect on the individual partners and routes
and could be evaluated based on the criteria in this article. Additionally, incentive schemes could base their allocation
decisions on the market environment to
compensate for the different risks that the
partners face. Similar schemes may also
be used to govern virtual codeshares and
to avoid underbidding.
Finally, although we pointed out that
pricing and revenue management pose
the greatest challenges, other areas of
planning and operations should not be
neglected. Especially joint airport resource planning as well as joint operations control provide new opportuni-

ties for future research and should be
systematically considered.
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